



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

tions and to modern democracy is vigorously asserted, the reader feels that the general connection of the Puritan movement with its political and social environment is but partially indicated, and that Mr. Gregory might well have followed the story of English Puritanism further than the reign of Elizabeth without transgressing the bounds which he has set for himself in the title of his volume. The evident and cheerfully acknowledged bias of the author has occasionally led him into assertions of a high degree of rashness, as, for example, the declaration that the Reformers "certainly succeeded in setting up a Church as different from and as diametrically opposed to the Church which it supplanted as Christianity is opposed to Hindooism." There are also a considerable number of errors, of no great importance when taken singly, perhaps, but making in the aggregate a disfigurement to the handbook; the numbering of Cotton Mather among those prominent in New England circles of 1648 is an illustration.

W. W.

Napoléon et Alexandre I^{er}. L'Alliance Russe sous le premier Empire.

Par ALBERT VANDAL. Tome III. La Rupture. (Paris: Plon, Nourrit et Cie. 1896. Pp. 607.)

COUNT VANDAL's belief in the wisdom and stability of the present alliance between France and Russia gives point to his criticisms of the Tilsit agreement as he writes the story of its failure. His first volumes described the relations of Alexander and Napoleon from their meeting on the raft in the Niemen until the end of 1810. This, the third, volume explains the steps by which both emperors abandoned an impossible position and prepared for the inevitable struggle. The last incident related in it is Napoleon's interview at Wilna, July 1, 1812, with Balachof, Alexander's emissary, some days after the Grand Army had crossed the Niemen and after the Russians had begun their strategic retreat. The struggle was inevitable, acutely remarks Count Vandal, because the rights which Napoleon could justly claim, in accordance with the treaty, had been created "à coups d'épée" and were for the conquered Russians "une conséquence de la défaite, une forme de la contrainte, et la contrainte ne maintient ses effets qu'à condition d'agir et de renouveler ses prises." "Il y a," he adds, "conflit insoluble entre le droit napoléonien et le droit naturel des États à s'orienter suivant leurs intérêts momentanés ou leurs inclinations, et le premier, fondé uniquement sur la victoire, portant en lui ce vice irrémissible, ne peut se soutenir que par la permanence et la continuité de la victoire."

Actual fighting did not begin for more than a year after the last sincere efforts to reach a good understanding had failed. Napoleon wished first not merely to organize the Grand Army, but also to move it across Germany so that he might strike the Russians within their own frontiers. This was exactly what Alexander wanted and was determined to wait for,

as soon as he became convinced that his best allies were the Russian climate and the vast spaces of the interior. Moreover, he needed time to push his operations against the Turks to a favorable conclusion. Meanwhile each emperor conducted a series of diplomatic manoeuvres which for duplicity are unrivalled in the annals of "backstairs" intrigue. One negotiator, Count Loewenhielm, who arranged with Alexander the transfer of Norway to Sweden as the price of Bernadotte's defection from Napoleon, naïvely described the diplomacy of the period, when, referring to the scruples the Czar must be supposed to feel against taking a hand in such an act of spoliation, he wrote from St. Petersburg, March 3, 1812: "Quelque peu que les principes de la justice soient en général admis dans les stipulations des puissances, les souverains ont toujours cherché à en colorer leurs vues, et il n'y a que l'empereur des Français dont la bonne foi plus audacieuse se soit mise au-dessus de cet usage."

With less skillful telling the story of this prolonged diplomatic fencing might become hopelessly intricate and puzzling, not to say tedious. But under Count Vandal's management it is clear, dramatic in its movement, with here and there the meaning of a whole group of incidents seized in a phrase. What could be more brilliant than the two lines in which are summed up the operations by which the Russians are to be checked in case they attempt an offensive campaign in 1811: "Napoléon les immobilisera sur la pointe de son épée, tendue au travers de l'Allemagne et insinuée jusqu'à la Vistule!"

Perhaps Count Vandal's most important contributions to the knowledge of the period are to be found in his description of the events which had determining weight in the minds of the two emperors when the question of war or peace was still undecided. After Alexander was obliged to give up his first plan of attacking Napoleon in the spring of 1811, supported by Germany and a kingdom of Poland reconstituted in the Russian interest, he was inclined to rely upon his military resources, accumulated for the projected war, to enable him safely to act as a neutral in the struggle between Napoleon and the English. Before this scheme had mastered his mind, however, the Chancellor Roumiantsof suggested that, if the dispossessed Duke of Oldenburg were given a portion of the Duchy of Warsaw as an indemnity, the Polish problem would be solved in a way as favorable to Russia as the original plan had seemed to be. For if once the vain expectations of the Poles were disappointed nothing could hinder the process of disintegration in the ephemeral state; and in some one of the conflicts which were at the very doors, the remnants would be engulfed in the wave of the advancing Slavic power. Could the Czar succeed in warding off the Polish peril he would be quite ready to modify his obnoxious ukase of December 31 excluding French goods, and to check the growing English commerce with Russia so thinly disguised under the American flag. Consequently Count Vandal shows Alexander, late in March, just when in accordance with his previous orders his troops were being massed near the frontier, sending off his confidential agent Tchernitchef, "l'éternel postillon," as De Maistre

called him, to Paris with orders to offer a compromise which should hint as clearly as was safe at some new dismemberment of Poland. But news had reached France of the movements of Russian troops. In a few lines Count Vandal sums up the awkward situation. He writes; “À l’instant où le péril s’ éloigne, Napoléon va l’apercevoir : il va se le figurer immédiat et pressant, se croire sous le coup d’ une attaque, répondre instantanément au défi et précipiter le mouvement de ses troupes : par une coïncidence fatale, il va en même temps recevoir l’offre conciliatrice et sentir la menace.”

Napoleon was naturally alarmed as the evidence of Russia’s warlike preparations kept coming in from his agents in Warsaw, but he was unable, from the carefully veiled suggestions of Tchernitchef, to comprehend the nature of the Czar’s demands. As the days passed and he began to realize the immensity of his own resources his desire for peace gradually disappeared. Caulaincourt, who had been recalled from St. Petersburg, reached Paris, June 5th, convinced of Alexander’s pacific intentions, and convinced also that Alexander would never yield should the struggle once begin. The same day he had a most remarkable conversation with Napoleon, the detailed impressions of which Count Vandal is able to give from private papers to which he has had access. As a final appeal Caulaincourt declared, “La guerre et la paix sont entre les mains de Votre Majesté. Je la supplie de réfléchir pour son propre bonheur et pour le bien de la France qu’elle va choisir entre les inconvénients de l’une et les avantages bien certain de l’autre.” “Vous parlez comme un russe,” says Napoleon, “redevenu sévère.” “Non, Sire, comme un bon Français, comme un fidèle serviteur de Votre Majesté.” It was not until Alexander had waited in vain for the peaceful overtures he expected as a consequence of Caulaincourt’s return that at last he threw all hesitations aside and resolutely prepared for war.

Count Vandal believes that the very elaborateness of Napoleon’s preparations in the months which followed compromised the success of his expedition. The machine was too elaborate ; it tempted disaster. In fact it broke down before the Niemen was crossed. The starving and marauding bands which entered Russian Poland as the advance-guard of the Grand Army chilled the enthusiasm which the emperor expected would greet his approach. As one reads this portion of Vandal’s narrative one has the feeling that Napoleon would have gladly withdrawn had it not been too late.

If Count Vandal’s account fails anywhere it is in giving such slight emphasis to the part the English played in the diplomatic drama of 1811 and 1812.

HENRY E. BOURNE.